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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF AUTOMATION TRANSPARENCY AND ETHICAL OUTCOMES ON
USER TRUST AND BLAME TOWARDS FULLY AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Nathan Andrew Hatfield
Old Dominion University, 2018
Director: Dr. Bryan Porter

The current study examined the effect of automation transparency on user trust and blame
during forced moral outcomes. Participants read through moral scenarios in which an
autonomous vehicle did or did not convey information about its decision prior to making a
utilitarian or non-utilitarian decision. Participants also provided moral acceptance ratings for
autonomous vehicles and humans when making identical moral decisions.
It was expected that trust would be highest for utilitarian outcomes and blame would be
highest for non-utilitarian outcomes. When the vehicle provided information about its decision,
trust and blame were expected to increase. Results showed that moral outcome and transparency
did not influence trust independently. Specifically, trust was highest for non-transparent nonutilitarian outcomes and lowest for non-transparent utilitarian outcomes. Blame was not found to
be influenced by either transparency, moral outcome, or their combined effects. Interestingly,
acceptance was determined to be higher for autonomous vehicles that made the same utilitarian
decision as humans, though no differences were found for non-utilitarian outcomes.
This research draws on the importance of active and passive harm and suggests that the
type of automation transparency conveyed to an operator may be inappropriate in the presence of
actively harmful moral outcomes. Theoretical insights into how ethical decisions are evaluated
when different agents (human or autonomous) are responsible for active or passive moral
decisions are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent news, fully autonomous vehicles have been faced with real-world moral
scenarios similar to those posed by the trolley problem. As of the writing of this thesis, Uber has
garnered national coverage after its self-driving vehicle failed to detect a pedestrian crossing the
road, resulting in the death of the pedestrian. The self-driving vehicle was occupied with a
passenger who experienced the vehicle’s failure to swerve, in which it is plausible that the
passenger’s attitudes toward the self-driving vehicle—to include trust and blame— changed as a
direct result of the incident. Similarly, a passenger traveling in Tesla’s Model X engaged the
adaptive cruise control feature during transport. While in an automated state, the vehicle
conveyed multiple visual warnings to the driver before crashing into a barricade, causing the
death of the single driver (Brown, 2018). Further inspection of the crash revealed that the driver
did not reassume control of the vehicle prior to the collision. Both accidents indicate that
autonomous vehicles have the potential to make costly errors with moral significance. Thus,
understanding how conveyed system information in the context of moral outcomes can impact
attitudes towards autonomous vehicles is critical.
The invention of the automobile has transformed the way humans travel and continues to
be a growing area for applied psychological research (e.g., Adrian, Postal, Moessinger, Rascal, &
Charles, 2011; Hennessy & Wiesenthal, 1999; Ross, et al., 2015; Stokols, Novaco, Stokols, &
Campbell, 1978). The American Automobile Association Foundation for Traffic Safety
(AAAFTS) reported that American drivers spend 46 minutes traveling each day, amounting to
nearly 10,700 accrued miles annually (Triplett, Santos, & Rosenbloom, 2015). Since 1991,
aggregate commute time and mileage have steadily increased (Travel Volume Trends, Federal
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Highway Administration, 2016); as a result, social and economic risks—such as fatalities and
carbon emissions—have increased (Blincoe et al., 2002; National Safety Council, 2017),
garnering attention from policy makers, researchers, and others impacted by such risks.
The World Health Organization (2013) reported that 1.25 million fatalities in 2013 were a
result of automobile accidents, making it the 9th leading contributor of death globally. In the
United States alone, 2015 federal crash data revealed the largest year-to-year percent increase in
motor vehicle deaths in nearly 50 years, resulting in 35,092 fatalities, and economic costs of
$242 billion dollars (NHTSA, 2015). The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA)—after reviewing results from the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey—
concluded that 93% of automobile accidents are a result of human error (Bellis & Page, 2008;
see also Singh, 2015). With these factors in mind, automobile manufacturers and policy makers
have pursued initiatives to offset the staggering number of life-threatening safety hazards,
recently with the goal of minimizing the role of the human operator through the advent of
autonomous vehicle technologies.
Autonomous Vehicle Technologies
Autonomous vehicle (AV) technologies have rapidly evolved in the 21st century, giving
the driver more flexibility, while minimizing routine-driving tasks normally reserved for the
human operator (Kiernan, 2015). AVs are expected to increase public safety by reducing
automobile accidents related to deliberate and even unintentional hazardous driving behaviors
(Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015; WHO, 2013). In addition, AV technologies have the potential to
bolster cost savings up to $5,000 a year by reducing travel times, carbon emissions, and fuel
consumption (Fagnant & Kockelman, 2015). These technologies are designed to navigate a
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traffic environment with limited human intervention via a suite of onboard computing settings
that analyze traffic-relevant data to make goal-oriented decisions on behalf of the driver.
To fully harness the benefits of AV technologies, NHTSA (2017) released a compendium
of guidelines to educate state policy makers on how to safely integrate AVs for testing on public
roadways. The guidelines feature a classification scheme for levels of automation adopted from
the Society of Automotive Engineers (2016), ranging from: no automation (Level 0), driverassistance automation (Level 1), partial automation (Level 2), conditional automation (Level 3),
high automation (level 4) and full automation (Level 5).
After partitioning these levels in terms of human involvement, Levels 4 and 5 differ from
Levels 0 through 3 by assuming all control of performance-based safety functions, with no
expectation for the driver to intervene under any circumstance, though the option may be
available. As a consequence, however, it is inevitable that fully autonomous vehicles (i.e., levels
4 and 5) will be exposed to crash scenarios whereby decisions must be made on behalf of the
driver without the driver’s knowledge or consent. Crash scenarios may have moral implications,
like deciding who lives and dies in an unavoidable crash, and research is needed to determine
how drivers will respond to such decisions carried out by fully autonomous vehicles.
Autonomous Ethics
Ethics is concerned with the governing principles or systems of thought that lead to
subsequent actions and behaviors (Kiernan, 2015). Ethics, according to the Human Factors and
Ergonomics Society (2005), is relevant to the safety of human operators, though research in this
field is limited when it comes to fully autonomous vehicles (Kumfer, Levulis, Olson & Burgess,
2016). More recently, some attention has been given to the role of ethics in designing
autonomous vehicles, with a specific emphasis on philosophical theories about right and wrong
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actions (Kumfer, Levulis, Olson, & Burgess, 2016). For example, to ensure an occupant’s safety,
instances may arise in which autonomous vehicles will need to abandon the roadway to avoid
accidents with other vehicles or pedestrians. Because fully autonomous vehicles are able to
perform actions without human intervention, rapid moral decisions will need to be made
independent of the driver. As expected, autonomous decisions pose real threats to drivers and
innocent bystanders, while also introducing potential shifts in accountability for the
consequences associated with the decision (Coeckelbergh, 2016).
According to Goodall’s (2014) developmental work in autonomous vehicle ethics,
scenarios that require ethical decisions from the autonomous vehicle have presented researchers
with a series of challenges: first, to understand how to program vehicles to make ethical
decisions that will not always have known outcomes; second, to ensure that cultural values and
laws are embedded within the programming framework; and third, to confirm decisions are
objective across a range of scenarios. These challenges will ultimately influence the way a
vehicle decides to navigate potential accidents, as well as deciding who lives and dies in a fatal
traffic scenario (Wallach & Allen, 2008). Greene, Rossi, Venable, and Tasioulas (2016)
suggested that before embedding governing principles into autonomous agents it is critical to
understand how to model such guidelines after human ethics, and thus referred to three schools
of thought —deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue— to inform how autonomous systems ought
to act. All three domains of thought have offered insight into machine ethics, though specific
attention has been given to utilitarianism when considering the complex and often multi-layered
scenarios that arise in traffic environments.
Utilitarianism, also known as consequentialism, is an approach to moral reasoning that
places emphasis on maximizing an optimal decision; and moral decisions are right to the degree
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in which the common good is promoted (Mill, 1901). Experimental ethics is a data-driven
approach that enables researchers to quantify and understand moral intuitions. The Trolley
Problem, originally designed by Foot (1978), has been used as such a method, and has helped
researchers to better understand the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in moral
decision-making processes (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene,
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004), while also illuminating discussions about how to
program autonomous vehicles (Nyholm & Smids, 2016).
The Trolley Problem has taken on many permutations since its inception, though the
footbridge and switch scenarios have become more popularized in discussions about
deontological (some actions are always wrong, regardless of their consequences) and utilitarian
(an action is wrong in proportion to its consequence) ethics. The footbridge scenario describes a
runaway trolley heading towards a group of people. Participants are presented with an option to
save the group of people by pushing a man off of an overhanging footbridge and onto a track
below, subsequently stopping the trolley and saving a group of five people in the trolley’s
onward path. The switch scenario is a modified version of the footbridge scenario and provides
participants with the option of flipping a switch to divert the trolley onto a separate track on
which one person is standing, ultimately taking the person’s life. Both scenarios present
participants with a trade-off between sacrificing one life to save a group of lives or allowing the
group to perish by not intervening. Results have found that participants deem the switch option
to be more morally acceptable than pushing a man off of a footbridge (Cushman, Young, &
Hauser, 2006) due to a dichotomy that exists between personal and impersonal harm similar to
Milgram’s (1974) work. Though some have argued that the Trolley Problem is too far removed
to make noteworthy contributions for understanding autonomous ethics (Nyholm & Smids,
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2016), until more sophisticated methods become available (Cushman & Greene, 2012), the
Trolley Problem remains a viable method to pioneer questions about driver attitudes towards
autonomous vehicles.
Bonnefon, Shariff, and Rahwan (2016), for example, designed scenarios that mirrored the
type of moral dilemmas featured in the Trolley Problem but revamped them to fit traffic
scenarios including autonomous vehicles. Participants were surveyed to determine how ethical
dilemmas influenced attitudes towards owning an AV. In general, participants thought it was
morally acceptable for an AV to sacrifice a passenger if it meant pedestrians could be saved,
though they were unwilling to purchase such an AV for themselves. These results highlight the
value users place on autonomous systems to carry out decisions that align with users’ ethical
preferences, and also highlight how ethical decisions can differ based on personal or impersonal
involvement with an autonomous vehicle (Greene et al., 2009).
Though Bonnefon et al. (2016) were the first to consider ethical dilemmas in terms of
autonomous vehicle technologies from a survey standpoint, Wintersberger, Frison, Riener, and
Boyle (2016) altered the switch Trolley Problem to better fit into a traffic context that was
appropriate for a driving simulator. The switch scenario required participants either to select a
switch in the driving simulator to reroute the vehicle thereby killing a group of pedestrians, or to
refrain from selecting the switch whereby the vehicle would stay on its projected course,
ultimately leading to self-inflicted harm. The participants were always presented with the option
of selecting the switch to make the AV swerve, though information about the type and quantity
of victim varied. In addition, each participant was given a percentage about their own life
expectancy to help the researchers determine the maximum threshold value in which they would
agree to stay the course and not swerve. The results revealed a significant effect of knowledge
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about life expectancy on deciding to swerve or stay—with participants being willing to risk their
own life to save the lives of others even when the probability of surviving the crash was low. In
addition, as the number of potential pedestrian causalities increased, the likelihood of the
participant allowing the vehicle to risk their life also increased.
Taken together, these studies reveal that data-driven techniques can be used to measure
decisions about usually abstract thoughts, which can be used to explore attitudes towards AVs
that make utilitarian or non-utilitarian decisions. The Trolley Problem may also provide a
framework to explore the effects of design features, such as automation transparency, on user
attitudes towards impending autonomous decisions. For example, if information about the
vehicle’s performance is withheld from the driver or if the vehicle’s actions deviate from the
driver’s expectations, the driver may express different attitudes, such as trust and blame, towards
the vehicle, potentially and significantly altering the driver-vehicle relationship.
Automation Transparency
An important factor of well-designed automation is the ability for automation to provide
feedback to the user about its performance state. Disclosing information to the user about the
system’s purpose, underlying processes, intent, future actions, or reasoning processes is
considered automation transparency (Endsley, Bolstad, & Jones, 2003; see also: Lee, 2012;
Mercado et al., 2016, p. 402). Ultimately, automation transparency serves to furnish the user with
an understanding of the automation’s internal operations and logic (Seong & Bisantz, 2008),
with the goal of supporting supervisory control or manual intervention (Ososky et al., 2014;
Sanders et al., 2014). Automation transparency can eliminate speculation about poor
performance originating from a system’s design, leading to increased trust (Chen, Barnes, &
Harper-Sciarini, 2011; Glass, McGuinness, & Wolverton, 2008; Lyons et al., 2017; Wang,
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Jamieson, & Hollands, 2009), engagement (Wright, 2015; Lyons, 2013), and understanding
(Körber, Prasch, & Bengler, 2018) when interacting with low and intermediate levels of
automation (Ensdley, 2017).
Adaptive cruise control (ACC), for example, is an intermediate automation setting that
enables the driver to select a desirable speed to be implemented by the vehicle’s throttleaccelerator. ACC is not fully autonomous and therefore relies on the driver to shift between
manual and intermediate automation settings. ACC collects data from the driving environment
and makes automated speed adjustments to maintain appropriate distance from a lead vehicle.
The system may request the driver to reassume control if performance limitations are exceeded.
A driver’s ability to understand an ACC system, to include knowing how and when to retake
control, is critical for avoiding potential crashes. ACC operators generally have difficulty
understanding how the system operates due to a lack of conveyed system information (Jenness et
al., 2008; Körber, Prasch, & Bengler, 2018; Stanton & Marsden, 1996), potentially interfering
with their ability to anticipate and retake control of the vehicle in a skilled manner (see Seppelt
& Lee, 2007). In contrast, ACC systems that display a continuous stream of real-time
information about the system’s performance can assist the operator with calibrating appropriate
user reliance, intervention and following strategies, and faster brake response times compared to
ACC systems that do not provide such information (Seppelt & Lee, 2007).
Trust in Automation
Trust in automation has been investigated in many contexts and has been found to mirror
social trust (Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996). Trust in automation is best captured during scenarios
characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability (Lee & See, 2004), whereby the user evaluates the
automation based on predefined expectations of how the automation is expected to act. Several
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models of trust have been proposed (Barber, 1983; Lee & Moray, 1994; Muir, 1994), with Ajzen
and Fishbein’s (1980) model being careful not to conflate distinct constructs of trust, such as
beliefs, intentions, attitudes, and behaviors. In fact, it is on the basis of these theoretical
components that Lee and See (2004, p. 54) defined trust as “an attitude that an agent will help
achieve an individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability.” Lee
and See (2004) re-emphasized Lee and Moray’s (1992) three-dimensional model of trust that
includes: performance, process, and purpose. The performance axiom of trust rests on a system’s
ability to execute actions in a manner that is consistent with a user’s goals; the process axiom of
trust rests on a system’s capability for completing an action given certain situational contexts;
and the purpose axiom of trust rests on a system’s intentionality for why it was developed.
Research on trust in automation has also considered the interplay of a system’s reliability
and human’s expectation of how a system will act (see Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Muir & Moray,
1996). Moreover, human-operators tend to trust automated systems that are highly reliable (Lee
& Moray, 1992) and behave according to expectations (Merritt & Ilgen, 2008; Robert, Denis, &
Hung, 2009), and distrust automated systems that fail to meet expectations (Lee & See, 2004).
Though many frameworks of trust in automation exist, this thesis operated on Lee and See’s
(2004) definition of trust and evaluated user’s attitudes towards an autonomous vehicle.
The level of trust humans place in automation can also influence strategies on how to use
automation (Lee & Moray, 1994). When humans overtrust a system to perform decisional tasks
more than themselves, they can become complacent and disengaged, leading to automation bias
(Mosier et al., 1998; Skitka, Mosier, & Burdick, 1999), poor detection of automation failures
(Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993), and automation misuse (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Similarly, when automation fails to live up to performance expectations, undertrust and
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automation disuse can occur (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997), resulting in unnecessary manual
control (Lee & Moray, 1994). Calibrating an appropriate level of trust is therefore essential for
furnishing cooperative and productive relationships between humans and automation (Sheridan
& Henessy, 1984), and is necessary to curtail misuse and disuse of fully autonomous vehicles
(Lee & See, 2004). When the user is made aware of the system’s inner workings, research
suggests that trust is better calibrated, and can withstand and recover from automation failure
(Wang, Jamieson, & Hollands, 2011).
Relationship Between Transparency and Trust
More recently, research has focused on the relationship between automation transparency
and trust, but not explicitly in the context of fully autonomous vehicles (Levels 4 and 5).
Verberne, Ham, and Midden (2012), for example, examined whether trust and acceptance ratings
in ACC systems (Levels 2 and 3) varied as a function of the system’s level of transparency.
Research has revealed that transparency can be broadly operationalized as the presence or
absence of information (e.g. Lyons et al. 2017). For example, Sheridan and Verplank’s (1978)
10-level automation classification scheme can be understood in terms of transparency, with low
automation (levels 1-5) providing information to the user without taking action on the user’s
behalf, intermediate automation (levels 6-7) providing information to the user while also taking
action on the user’s behalf, and full automation (levels 8-10) taking over complete control
without providing information to the user about its actions. Verberne and colleagues (2012)
found that ACC systems that provide information about driving tasks in the form of pictorial
icons (information present) are more trusted and accepted than ACC systems that do not provide
information (information absent). Moreover, trustworthiness was higher for ACC systems that
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provided information to the user without taking action, an important finding when considering
fully autonomous vehicles.
Similarly, Beller, Heesen, and Vollrath (2013) investigated whether changes in the
driver-vehicle relationship occurred when uncertainty warnings about the ACC’s performance
were issued to the driver via a graphical modality displayed on the dashboard. The icon was used
to give the driver an indication of the vehicle’s uncertainty in times of inadequate selfperformance, a form of automation transparency (Mercado et al., 2016). Uncertainty warnings
resulted in higher subjective trust scores compared to non-warnings. Other research suggests that
using textual (Chen et al., 2014) or auditory (Forster, Naujoks, & Neukum, 2017) explanations
can increase trust so long as the system’s decision-making processes are conveyed to the user
(see Northdurft & Minker, 2016; Oduor &Wiebe, 2008; Sanders, Wixon, Schafer, Chen, &
Hancock, 2014).
Blaming Automation
It is plausible that shared social norms between technology and humans (Nass, Fogg, &
Moon, 1996) will lead to instances where the user will not only trust (Nass & Lee, 2001; Reeves
& Nass, 1996) a system but also blame a system for not conforming to performance
expectations, especially if nonconformities are perceived to be intentional (Malle, Monroe, &
Guglielmo, 2014). Blame evaluations, according to Malle, Guglielmo, and Monroe (2012), can
be divided into three categories: affirming norms, evaluating events, and evaluating agents.
Affirming norms is the process by which norms are evaluated against other norms; evaluating
events is the process by which observers appraise the outcome of an event against a set of norms;
and evaluating agents is the process by which observers assign moral consequences, such as
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blame, to agents that contributed to a negative event outcome (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe,
2014).
Before blame can be ascribed to the agent for a negative outcome, the individual first
considers whether the outcome was intentional (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2012). If the
negative outcome is deemed to be intentional, the individual then determines whether the agent
was justified in making the decision based on the reasons leading up to the outcome—whereby
blame is less severe if the agent’s reasons are justifiable (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014).
Intentionality is a primary criterion for which blame is assigned to an agent (Alicke, 2000), and
research suggests that humans consider agents, such as computers, to be intentional (Friedman &
Millet, 1995).
In terms of automation research, blame has received little attention, but may be intimately
related to trust in automation. Research has found that automation transparency, when presented
in the form of system reasoning, increases subjective trust ratings (Glass, McGuiness, &
Wolverton, 2008). Because automation transparency conveys a system’s reasoning to the
operator, the operator may also be in a position to evaluate the system’s reasoning against the
system’s performance outcomes and assign blame when optimal outcomes are violated. In fact,
Gray and colleagues (2007) found that technology with a conveyed state of mindfulness can
make users more prone to blame systems for wrong actions, giving credence to the system being
perceived as a responsible moral agent (Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2010). The relationship
between automation transparency, trust, and blame therefore introduces the possibility of an
automation irony (see Bainbridge, 1983). Specifically, automation transparency can be used to
communicate a system’s reasoning processes: leading to increased trust. In contrast, automated
systems without transparency can make users less trusting, but the system should not be
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perceived as an intentional agent with an independent mind worthy of blame to the same degree
as a transparent system. Therefore, designing systems that are more transparent may increase
trust while simultaneously increasing the opportunity for blame due to increased intentionality.
Relationship Between Transparency and Blame
Automated systems that possess anthropomorphic qualities, such as rational thought and
expressive emotion, have been found to affect the way users trust and blame technologies (Gray,
Gray, & Wegner, 2007). Waytz, Heafner, and Epley (2010), for example, investigated user-trust
and blame assignment for anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic autonomous vehicles. The
results found that anthropomorphic vehicles that possessed a name, gender, and voice were better
trusted than vehicles that did not have such qualities. The study also found that participants were
less likely to assign blame to anthropomorphic autonomous vehicles that were struck by another
vehicle than agentic vehicles. Though the authors were unable to pinpoint why blame scores
differed between autonomous vehicle conditions, they drew on the role human-like qualities
played in diminishing the perceived responsibility attributed to the anthropomorphic vehicle. If
the anthropomorphic autonomous vehicles were at fault for the accident, however,
anthropomorphic qualities might also elicit more blame from the user due to perceived reasoning
abilities, a precursor for ascribing blame (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014).
Similarly, Kim and Hinds (2006) explored blame and credit assignment in low and high
autonomous robots. The study hypothesized that highly autonomous robots would receive higher
blame scores than low autonomous robots, due to the perceived level of intention inherent in
highly autonomous robots, such as conveyed information about performance and actions.
Robots were considered transparent if an explanation was given for an unexpected behavior and
non-transparent if not. The results confirmed that higher blame scores were assigned to highly
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autonomous robots as compared to low autonomous robots. The results did not find the
transparent manipulation to explain blame beyond the automation condition, arguably because
the autonomy manipulation was already inherently transparent or non-transparent. These results
indicate that fully autonomous robots might be perceived as transparent and therefore worthy of
blame when performance information is conveyed to the user.
Malle, Schuetz, Arnold, Voiklis, and Cusimano (2015) investigated the degree to which
blame assignment differed between a human or robot character when presented with the same
moral dilemma. The dilemma was a classic utilitarian tradeoff in which a human or robot took
action or remained inactive when determining the direction of a trolley. Acceptance ratings for
taking action to produce a utilitarian outcome were higher for the robot than the human,
suggesting that participants expected robots to make these decisions slightly more than humans.
Conversely, when the robot character did not intervene to produce a utilitarian outcome,
participants assigned more blame to the robot than the human character that made the exact same
decision. The results highlight differences in moral expectations for humans and robots, with
robots being held more accountable than humans for not intervening to produce a utilitarian
outcome and also being held less accountable than humans for intervening to produce a
utilitarian outcome. Moreover, though not measured in this study, the authors suggested that trust
might be affected when robots deviate from expected outcomes, in which robots will need to
offer reasoning for their decisions to maintain trust.
Human Factors, Ethics, and Autonomous Vehicles
Autonomous vehicles that are forced to make ethical decisions might be a strong avenue
for exploring whether blame and trust assignment varies as a function of high or low
transparency. Because humans and automated technologies share social norms during interaction
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(Reeves & Nass, 1996), understanding the types of norms humans expect autonomous vehicles
to uphold warrants the need for further investigation and presents a unique avenue for marrying
ethics and human factors research.
Where prior research has looked at trust and blame separately, this thesis combined both
constructs and included morality and transparency in the experimental design. Moreover, this
thesis served to determine how autonomous vehicles are evaluated when making optimal or nonoptimal moral decisions. This was an important extension to past research, in that evaluations
would not only be made on the basis of a moral outcome but also the agent performing the
outcome. Participants who are more morally accepting of optimal moral decisions were expected
to be more trusting of autonomous vehicles that executed optimal moral decisions, especially
when the autonomous vehicle’s rationale supported such decisions. Moreover, rationale for
optimal moral decisions might further increase trust than optimal moral decisions that lack
rationale. Including a layer of system transparency in the experimental methodology may further
support what is known about trust in automation. Yet, it remains unknown how system
transparency will also influence blame ascription when non-optimal moral outcomes occur. This
thesis examined potential changes in blame ascription when an autonomous vehicle was directly
responsible for a moral outcome, dissimilar from Waytz, Hefner, and Epley’s (2014)
methodology that assessed blame when another vehicle was at fault.
Lastly, this thesis sought to explore potential discrepancies between Malle et al’s (2015)
and Bonnefon et al.’s (2015) findings. Bonnefon et al’s (2015) research indicated that moral
permissibility is highest for utilitarian autonomous vehicles that do not sacrifice the driver. Malle
et al’s (2015) research found that moral preference differs for humans and robots faced with the
same moral scenario, with robots being expected to make utilitarian decisions more than humans.
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Malle’s experiment separated robot actions from human actions, whereas the nature of
Bonnefon’s study requires autonomous vehicles to perform actions on behalf of humans. Thus,
exploring potential differences in moral permissibility when a human does or does not have
control of the vehicle was expected to introduce dissimilarities in moral norms.
Therefore, the current study examined the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1
Trust and blame scores would differ between the transparent condition and the non-transparent
condition, with trust and blame scores being higher in the transparent condition.
Hypothesis 2
Trust and blame scores would differ between utilitarian outcomes and non-utilitarian outcomes,
with trust scores being higher in the utilitarian condition and blame scores being higher in the
non-utilitarian condition.
Exploratory Interaction
Trust scores would decrease in the non-utilitarian non-transparent condition and increase in the
utilitarian transparent condition. In addition, blame scores would increase in the non-utilitarian
transparent condition and decrease in the utilitarian transparent condition.
Exploratory Question:
Moral acceptance ratings would be higher, in general, for AV outcomes than for synonymous
human outcomes.

17

II. METHOD
Sample Estimate and Experimental Design
An a priori power analysis was conducted using a statistical power analysis software,
G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The analysis assumed a power of .80 for
the main effects and interaction. Given the 2 X 2 Analysis of Variance being conducted for trust
and blame, results from the power analysis for the main effects and the interaction term were the
same, due to the same degrees of freedom for each term. A conservative effect size of .05 partial
eta squared was chosen for this study, with an alpha level set at .05. The power analysis indicated
152 participants were needed to detect the proposed effect. Thus, a minimum of 38 participants
were needed for each condition of the 2 (transparent vs non-transparent) X 2 (utilitarian vs nonutilitarian) between-subjects design.
Participants
Undergraduate psychology students (N = 186, Mage = 23.5 years, SD = 6.57, age range:
18-51 years) were recruited from Old Dominion University’s SONA participant pool: male (N =
43, Mage = 22.54) and female (N = 142, Mage = 23.20). Each participant was awarded .5
research credit after completing the study (for work expected to require less than 30 minutes).
The only criterion for participation in this study was for students to have a valid driver’s license
and be at least 18 years of age.
Materials
Two scenarios provided the framework for each of the four separate conditions featured
in this thesis (see Appendix A for each scenario). Following Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg,
Nystrom, and Cohen’s (2008) and Malle et al.’s (2015) methodology, we required participants to
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read about an autonomous vehicle faced with a moral dilemma in which the autonomous vehicle
made a utilitarian or non-utilitarian decision. Participants were then instructed to answer a moral
acceptance scale based on the autonomous vehicle making a utilitarian decision. The moral
acceptance scale required participants to answer “yes” or “no” about the moral acceptability of
the autonomous vehicle, and were then required to rate the moral acceptability of the action on a
nine-point Likert scale (1 = completely unacceptable, 9 = completely acceptable). At the end of
the study, participants rated the moral acceptability of a similar moral dilemma, only this time a
human driver was making the moral decision and not an autonomous vehicle.
Trust in automation was measured by a 12-item questionnaire developed by Jian, Bisantz,
and Drury (2000) (see Appendix B). Each item was measured using a seven-point Likert scale (1
= totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). Each item of the scale was adapted so that the word
“system” was replaced with “autonomous vehicle”, similar to that of Verberne, Ham, Midden’s
(2012) questionnaire. Responses for each item (e.g., “I would be confident in the autonomous
vehicle if it were my own.”) were recorded so that higher scores represented higher trust in
automation. According to the reliability analysis conducted, the data revealed moderate
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .77).
Blame was assessed using Waytz, Heafner, and Epley’s (2014) Blame for vehicle
measure. The measure is comprised of 8 items using a ten-point Likert scale (0 = not at all, 10 =
very much) (see Appendix C). Questions measured participants’ blame for the transparent or
non-transparent vehicle’s decision as well as the passenger of the vehicle (e.g., “How much is the
car itself at fault?”). In total, six of eight items constituted a single composite score for blame
ratings toward the self-driving vehicle, indicating strong internal consistency reliability
(Cronbach’s alpha = .87).
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Procedure
Before soliciting participants, the study was approved by Old Dominion University’s
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Participants registered to complete the experiment via the
department’s SONA platform; the survey itself was administered via Qualtrics. Participants
were given a brief overview of the study’s purpose and a notification sheet describing the study.
The experiment lasted approximately 15 minutes. Qualtrics randomly assigned participants to the
conditions of a 2 (transparency level: transparent vs non-transparent) x 2 (driving outcome:
utilitarian vs non-utilitarian) between-subjects experimental design, and counterbalanced the
presentation of one of four driving scenarios. Each driving scenario included a brief description
of the autonomous vehicle’s capabilities before further manipulations (i.e., transparency or moral
outcome) were made. Participants first provided a moral acceptance rating for the autonomous
vehicle’s initial moral dilemma, and then continued reading the scenario in which transparency
and moral outcome were manipulated. For each moral outcome, participants were presented with
a manipulation check in which they were asked if the autonomous vehicle provided any
information about why it decided to pursue a particular course of moral action. After reading the
final outcome, participants’ attitudes of blame and trust were measured. Participants were then
asked to complete the same moral acceptance scale but for a human who was faced with the
exact same dilemma as the autonomous vehicle. Upon completing all three scales, demographic
information was collected from each participant (see Appendix D).
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III. RESULTS
Of the 186 participants, 35% incorrectly answered the manipulation check. The
manipulation check was designed to assess participants’ attention to each scenario and
understanding of the vehicle’s conveyed information. For the transparency condition, the vehicle
provided information to participants about its course of action, in which participants should have
indicated that the vehicle did in fact provide information. Similarly, for the non-transparent
condition, participants should have answered “no” when asked if the vehicle provided
information about its course of action, because no information was provided to the participant.
Removing participants who failed the manipulation check from the sample resulted in unequal
sample sizes across conditions. Therefore, the results and conclusions were interpreted with
caution for those who incorrectly answered the manipulation check.
All analyses were conducted with a standard alpha level set at .05, using R (R Core
Team, 2017). Data for blame and trust were analyzed separately in a 2 (transparency, no
transparency) x 2 (utilitarian, non-utilitarian) between-subjects ANOVA. The data were first
analyzed to ensure the assumptions of ANOVA were not violated. Subsequently, all effects—
main and interaction—were tested, and Bonferroni’s adjustment was used for post-hoc analyses
to maintain familywise alpha at .05.
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Table 1
Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals
Variable

M

SD

1. Mean blame

6.97

2.47

2. Mean trust

3.29

0.91

1

2

3

.27**
[.13, .39]

3. Human accept
4. AV accept

3.15
3.34

2.22
2.20

-.18*

.11

[-.31, -.04]

[-.04, .25]

-.19*

.01

.71**

[-.32, -.04]

[-.14, .15]

[.63, .77]

Note. * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .01. M and SD are used to represent mean and standard deviation,
respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.

Trust
Average mean trust scores were submitted to a 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA, with
transparency and moral outcome as fixed, between subjects factors. Mean trust scores were
normally distributed as evidenced by skewness (.220) and kurtosis (.785) values falling below
recommended cutoff values of ± 2 (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2014). Levene’s test indicated that
homogeneity of variance was not violated, F(3, 182) = 1.84, p = .142. Averaging across moral
outcome, a significant main effect for transparency was not found, F(1, 182) = .657, p = . 419,
partial h2 = .004, indicating that a vehicle communicating its rationale may not increase trust any
more than a vehicle not communicating its rationale, refuting Hypothesis 1 that argued more
communication would increase trust. Averaging across transparency, there was no significant
main effect for moral outcome, F(1, 182) = 2.29, p = . 132, partial h2 = .012, suggesting that
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utilitarian moral decisions may not increase trust any more than non-utilitarian moral decisions,
refuting Hypothesis 2 that argued utilitarian decisions would increase trust more than nonutilitarian decisions. The interaction of transparency and moral outcome was significant F(1,
182) = 4.96, p = .027, partial η2 = .03. Post-hoc comparisons using Bonferroni’s familywise
adjustment (see Maxwell & Delaney, 2003, p. 308) explored the interaction by examining the
simple effect of A within specific levels of B (𝛼 =

.%&
'

= .025). Post hoc analyses revealed that

mean trust scores for the non-utilitarian non-transparent condition (M = 3.59, SD = 1.06) were
significantly higher than the utilitarian non-transparent condition (M = 3.10, SD = .86), t(90)= 2.44, p =.017, d= .51. Such findings indicate that differences in trust for non-utilitarian moral
decisions depends on the absence of communication to the driver. This finding departed from the
proposed direction of the Exploratory Interaction that transparent AVs would receive more trust
when making utilitarian decisions than non-transparent AVs making non-utilitarian decisions.
No other significant simple effects were observed.
Table 2
Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using Mean Trust as the criterion
Predictor
(Intercept)
moral
transp
moral x
transp
Error

Sum
of
Squares
2019.10
1.84
0.53
3.98
146.35

df

Mean
Square

2
partial η

F

p

2
partial η

95% CI
[LL, UL]

1
1
1

2019.10
1.84
0.53

2511.00
2.29
0.66

<.001
.132
.419

.01
.00

[.00, .06]
[.00, .04]

1

3.98

4.96

.027

.03

[.00, .09]

182

0.80

Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively.
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Figure 1. The difference in mean trust scores between utilitarian and non-utilitarian conditions as a function of
transparency. Error bars represent 95% between-subject confidence intervals.

Table 3
Bonferroni Comparison for Mean Trust

Comparisons
Trans vs Non-Trans
(level: Util)
Trans vs Non-Trans
(level: Non-Util)
Util vs. Non-Util
(level: Trans)
Util vs. Non-Util
(level: Non-Trans)

Mean Trust
Difference
.19

p

95% CI of the
Difference
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
-0.17
0.55

Std. Error
Difference
0.18

.311

-.39

0.19

.038

-0.78

-0.02

.09

0.17

.582

-0.24

.43

-.49

0.20

.017*

-0.89

-.09

* p < 0.025 (Bonferroni correction for significant interaction requires an examination of the simple effect
.%&
.%&
of A within specific levels of B and vice versa. To maintain familywise alpha at .05: 𝛼 = - = ' =
.025. ).

24

Blame
Average mean blame scores were submitted to a 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA, with
transparency and moral outcome as fixed, between-subjects factors. Mean blame scores were
normally distributed as evidenced by skewness (-.936) and kurtosis (.343) values falling below
recommended cutoff values of ± 2 (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2014). Levene’s test indicated that
homogeneity of variance was not violated, F(3, 182) = .182, p = .909. All of the proposed effects
were not significant, refuting Hypotheses 1, Hypothesis 2, and the Exploratory Interaction. These
findings suggest that utilitarian and non-utilitarian moral outcomes—as well as the vehicle’s
communication strategy—do not influence blame towards autonomous vehicles independently or
jointly.
Table 4
Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using Mean Blame as the criterion
Predictor
(Intercept)
moral
transp
moral x transp
Error

Sum
of
Squares
9022.27
5.99
0.30
0.17
1121.60

df
1
1
1
1
182

Mean
Square
9022.27
5.99
0.30
0.17
6.16

2
partial η

F
1464.02
0.97
0.05
0.03

p

2
partial η

95% CI
[LL, UL]

<.001
.326
.825
.867

.01
.00
.00

[.00, .05]
[.00, .02]
[.00, .02]

Note. LL and UL represent the lower-limit and upper-limit of the partial η2 confidence interval, respectively.
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Figure 2. The difference in mean blame scores between utilitarian and non-utilitarian conditions as a function of
transparency. Error bars represent 95% between-subject confidence intervals.

Acceptance
Lastly, two paired-samples t-tests were conducted to compare moral acceptance scores
towards human drivers and autonomous vehicles for each moral outcome type. The results
indicated that for utilitarian outcomes, mean moral acceptance scores were significantly higher
for autonomous vehicles (M = 3.33, SD = 2.2) than for humans (M = 2.9, SD = 2.16), t(93) =
2.75, p = .007, d = .28. This finding suggests that humans may hold other humans to higher
moral standards than vehicles when an actionable decision must be made. Moral acceptance
scores for autonomous vehicles (M = 3.35, SD = 2.21) were not significantly different from
humans (M = 3.39, SD = 2.27) when making a synonymous non-utilitarian decision, t(91) = -.23,
p = .82, d = .02, indicating that moral standards may be similar for both agents when the
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outcome is a result of inaction. See figures 3 and 4, respectively. Taken together, the results
partially support the Exploratory Question that AVs would receive higher acceptance ratings
than humans for synonymous moral outcomes.

Figure 3: Note. The difference in mean acceptance scores between humans and autonomous vehicles making the
same utilitarian decision. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 4: Note. The difference in mean acceptance scores between humans and autonomous vehicles making the
same non-utilitarian decision. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The effect of autonomous vehicle transparency on trust and blame has not been
investigated in moral contexts, where conveyed information may or may not interact with a
moral outcome. To explore these constructs, the current study required participants to read
through a moral scenario that resulted in an autonomous vehicle making a utilitarian or nonutilitarian decision with or without information to support its decision.
Overview of Findings and Theoretical Implications
Trust in automation has been found to vary as a function of transparency (Lyons et al.,
2017; Verberne, Ham, & Midden, 2012), with trust increasing for systems that convey
information to the user during performance. Blame has also been found to increase in the
presence of automation transparency (Kim & Hinds, 2006). Unexpectedly, automation
transparency did not result in significantly higher trust or blame scores independent of moral
outcome, contesting Hypothesis 1. A potential lack of manipulation saliency may have interfered
with the expected transparency effect when acting independently. When, however, the
transparency manipulation was coupled with non-utilitarian outcomes, trust in automation
increased (Exploratory Interaction). Subsequently, the effects of transparency and moral outcome
did not influence blame as expected. It is difficult to pinpoint an explanation for these results—
because blame ascription, in part, requires an agent to intentionally violate a user’s expectation,
and moral expectations were not explicitly balanced in the experimental procedures—a
limitation of the study.
Second, utilitarian moral outcomes were expected to result in higher user trust and lower
user blame, due to partiality given to five-for-one tradeoffs that mediate moral action through
some other device (in this case the vehicle) (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007;
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Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008). The results do not support this hypothesis and indicate that moral
outcomes may not be assessed solely on aggregate loss and gains, but rather other factors, such
as intentionality (Greene et al, 2009) and direct or indirect harm (Aquinas, 1988; Greene et al.,
2001).
Literature on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (Quinn, 1989; Rickless, 1997) may
provide insight into why higher trust was found for non-utilitarian outcomes in the presence of
non-transparency. The automaticity hypothesis suggests that moral actions are evaluated
implicitly, in which active harm is less morally acceptable than passive harm (Cushman et al.,
2006; Gleicher et al., 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). The practice of allowing harm to
occur is known as an omission bias, whereas doing harm is known as a commission bias (Baron
& Ritov, 2004). Engaging in an act that results in a negative outcome as a means to prevent a
more widespread negative outcome is more morally salient, and thereby less morally acceptable
(Ritov & Baron, 1990). Moreover, a vehicle remaining on course and allowing five pedestrians
to die is more acceptable (omission bias) than choosing to kill one pedestrian actively
(commission bias), because adverse emotions are more salient for action than for inaction
(Bartels, 2008; Greene et al., 2008).
Though the optimal decision in a moral dilemma would be to ensure the least amount of
aggregate loss, the vehicle would have to actively inflict harm in order to do so, perhaps
activating strong emotional responses and perceived responsibility for such decisions (see
Greene et al., 2001; Ritov & Baron, 1990). Considering that both outcomes resulted in death, it is
plausible that participants supported the vehicle’s omission, leading to higher trust than vehicles
that made a commission (active response), thereby supporting the Doctrine of Doing and
Allowing and discrediting traditional consequentialist beliefs. Taken together, consequentialism
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should not serve as a panacea for autonomous vehicle programming guidelines but rather a
starting point. To increase trust, manufacturers should better understand the diverse nature of
human moral preferences and how autonomous systems can be designed to execute actions in
alignment with such preferences.
The transparency manipulation in this thesis can be understood in terms of messages that
contain how information or a combination of how and why information. Participants assigned to
the transparency condition, for example, were provided with information about how and why the
autonomous vehicle took a specific course of action (how and why manipulation), while
participants in the non-transparent condition were only informed about the vehicle’s course of
action without the vehicle’s rationale (how without why manipulation). Paralleling Koo and
colleague’s (2015) findings, those that were provided with how and why information (the
transparency manipulation) were less trusting of the autonomous vehicle, perhaps due to an
additional need for cognitive resources to comprehend the vehicle’s rationale. Further
examination of the manipulation check supports this assumption, with 24% of the total fail rate
occurring in the transparency condition.
In extension, this study suggests that a failure to describe an autonomous vehicle’s
rationale for an omission outcome may have contributed to higher trust ratings. When decision
rationale is not provided by a vehicle, users may not assign intent or evaluate the vehicle’s
rationale against their own preferences as would be expected for a transparent autonomous
vehicle (see Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). Automation transparency can be thought of in
terms of its influence on perceived vehicle agency. The transparency condition may have led to
higher perceptions of vehicle agency due to the vehicle’s capability for reason (Waytz, Heafner,
& Epley, 2010), and agency implies that a system is an animate object capable of personal
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preference and intent (transparency manipulation) (see, for example, Bandura, 2006), rather than
an impersonal machine operating from a set of opaque, binary programs (no- transparency
manipulation) (see Pacherie, 2008). That is, when an autonomous vehicle provides information
about how and why it will respond to a moral decision, participants may be less approving of
actions due to a higher degree of intentionality inherent in the transparency manipulation.
The positive correlation between trust and blame may indicate a connection between
vehicle action and vehicle responsibility. Specifically, because the passenger is not responsible
for the vehicle’s decision, the passenger is fully capable of trusting the vehicle while also
blaming the vehicle for the damage that occurred, a type of moral scapegoating. Rothschild,
Landau, Sullivan, and Keefer (2012), for example, found that people tend to preserve their moral
identity by relegating responsibility for harmful actions onto a third party. In this thesis the
passenger did not have to make a moral decision (i.e., swerve or not swerve), indicating that they
trust the vehicle’s decision while simultaneously blaming the vehicle for the harm committed.
Lastly, it was expected that when the same moral outcome was performed by a human
and an autonomous vehicle, the autonomous vehicle would receive higher acceptance scores.
The results suggest that humans may hold machines and humans to different moral standards
depending on the moral outcome and the agent responsible for the outcome. Specifically, moral
acceptance was higher for autonomous vehicles that made the same utilitarian decision as
humans. When, however, autonomous vehicles and humans made non-utilitarian decisions,
acceptance scores did not differ. In light of the doctrine of Doing and Allowing, the findings
suggest that when active harm needs to be taken (commission bias), it is more morally acceptable
for an autonomous vehicle to make the moral decision than a human. In contrast, and unique to
this study, when a passive, non-utilitarian decision was made, participants did not hold humans
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or autonomous vehicles to different moral standards. This finding may suggest that when
passive harm is taking place, it makes no difference who is behind the wheel.
In the case of fully autonomous vehicles, scenarios may arise in which philosophy and
human factors collide at the level of system design and personal ethics, in which the Trolley
Problem can help explore the effects of automation transparency and ethical outcomes on user
trust and blame. Because autonomous vehicles will make decisions on behalf of the driver, it
may be important for the driver to be informed of how and why an action will be executed,
especially when such actions are morally charged. In fact, Greene and colleagues (2016, p. 4147)
stated that: “humans would accept and trust more machines that behave as ethically as other
humans in the same environment.”
Limitations
The larger body of research suggests that transparency manipulations hinge on the
presence (transparent) or absence (non-transparent) of information, and operational definitions of
transparency are lacking in several regards. Presence of information about a system’s
performance-state, for example, does not imply that users will draw correct conclusions about
what the system is meaning to convey. When a system provides information to a user, it
showcases its potential for performing an action—but determining why an action is being
performed may be cognitively demanding and lost in translation on the user depending on the
message’s content (Koo et al., 2016).
The transparency manipulation employed in this thesis operated on the presence or
absence of information paradigms currently used in the literature (Beller, Heesen, &Vollrath,
2013; Kim & Hinds, 2006; Verberne, Ham, & Midden, 2012), when transparency may not be
manipulated as casually. More recently, presence of information has been parsed into several
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constituent parts, such as why, how, and a combination of why and how a system intends to
perform an action (Koo et al., 2016), and starker contrasts between each construct may better
elicit differences in trust and blame. The manipulation check in this experiment could have
captured additional information about the transparency manipulation if participants rated each
constituent construct along a continuum.
After reflection, the scenarios in this thesis always resulted in the vehicle swerving into
one pedestrian to avoid five pedestrians, and never vice versa. If the vehicle had to swerve to kill
five pedestrians, subsequently saving the one pedestrian, the automaticity hypothesis would
suggest that the outcome makes no difference because active harm is required. Scenarios that
include both swerve combinations will better assess if traditional consequential beliefs bend in
the presence of omission and commission biases, while further isolating the effects of
transparency and moral outcomes on trust and blame. Measuring participants’ moral preferences
prior to manipulating the moral outcome would also provide additional experimental utility. It
should be noted that it is difficult to draw specific conclusions when moral violations were not
specifically measured or balanced in this study. Though a utilitarian outcome seems like an
optimal moral decision, the influence of active and passive harm may interfere with accepting
such an outcome. Thus, creating instances in which the moral outcome violates or agrees with
participants’ moral preferences is needed, especially considering how perceived intentional
violations can influence blame assignment (Shaver, 1985).
Future Research
This study can be extended by creating moral scenarios for a driving simulator. A driving
simulator would enable additional behavioral data to be collected, such as eye movements and
brake response times—two variables that could provide further detail about higher order moral
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processing. Eye tacking helps identify where attentional resources are distributed and would be a
useful method for determining if drivers’ eye movements can be mapped to moral dispositions.
For example, if a driver adheres to consequentialist beliefs, attentional resources may only be
reserved for making utilitarian decisions, as indicated by fixations directed toward one person
instead of five leading up to a moral outcome. When paired with a transparent autonomous
vehicle, it is plausible that fixations will be directed towards the vehicle’s upcoming decision—
or redistributed to unrelated driving tasks— so long as the driver perceives the vehicle’s
algorithm to be in concert with his or her moral preference. From this perspective, incongruence
between the driver’s moral preference and the vehicle’s rationale may be reflected in the driver’s
fixations, scan patterns (i.e., vertical and horizontal standard deviations), and manual
interventions. That is, drivers that disagree with the vehicle’s rationale may attempt to intervene
by depressing the brake pedal or fixating less frequently on the outcome in protest to the
vehicle’s decision.
Including different levels of automation, ranging from no automation (manual control),
intermediate automation (i.e., ACC), and full automation, would also inform the field’s
knowledge of moral human-automation interaction. When automation leverages human
performance instead of fully replacing human performance, a greater distribution of
responsibility across the human-automation partnership is expected to follow. When two parties
are equally responsible for moral outcomes, trust and blame may vary as a function of
responsibility, adding to the overall conversation of legal liability.
Conclusion
The current study examined the effects of automation transparency and moral outcome on
user trust and blame towards fully autonomous vehicles. The results suggest that participants are
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more trusting of vehicles that make non-utilitarian decisions without explanations than utilitarian
decisions without explanations. The results also found no significant effects of moral outcome or
transparency on blame, leading to speculation about the saliency of the transparency
manipulation and the importance of measuring moral expectations prior to manipulating moral
outcomes. Moral acceptance ratings favored autonomous vehicles that made utilitarian decisions
more than humans that made the same decision, but the same effect was not found for nonutilitarian decisions. These findings suggest that moral norms may differ depending on who is
performing the action (or inaction). The current research can offer insight regarding the nature of
ethical dilemmas on public roadways and carve out a path for future research to explore the
ramifications of automated moral decisions.
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APPENDIX A
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE ATTITUDE’S SURVEY
There has been a need to understand how peoples’ attitudes towards autonomous vehicles can
differ based on the vehicle’s automation setting. I want to explore how these attitudes can vary
amongst a sample of students.
I am writing to ask for your help with my research effort. As a master’s student in Experimental
Psychology, I am pursuing this topic as part of my research fundamentals requirement. I am
completing my thesis under the supervision of Dr. Bryan Porter, Associate Dean of the Graduate
School.
Attached is a brief survey to collect information about user attitudes towards autonomous
vehicles and how they may or may not be affected by certain driving scenarios. Survey responses
are anonymous. Personally-identifiable data will not be collected. In addition, survey questions
will be randomized into block groupings, with each participant receiving one randomly assigned
block of questions. Therefore, I will be unable to share any individual’s data with his/her
program. You will earn 0.5 credits to be used toward your research participation requirement in
your psychology course.
If you have questions, do not hesitate to contact me at 757-812-9813 or at my email:
nhatf001@odu.edu.
Thank you very much for considering my request. I look forward to hearing from you should the
need arise.
Sincerely,
Nathan Hatfield| nhatf001@odu.edu
Researcher | Masters Candidate, Experimental Psychology
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia 23259
757-812-9813
Supervisor:
Bryan E. Porter, Ph.D. | bporter@odu.edu
Associate Dean, the Graduate School
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia 23259
757-683-3259
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AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE ATTITUDE SURVEY
Directions (Please read carefully)
Thank you for participating in our survey. The data we collect from you will be anonymous and
completely confidential, and will be used to support data collection efforts to satisfy thesis
requirements.
On the following page you will be presented with a description of a situation and an action that
an autonomous vehicle in that situation might perform in response to that situation. Your job is
to tell us (1) whether you think it would be morally acceptable for the autonomous vehicle to
perform this action, (2) how morally acceptable/ unacceptable this action would be, (3) followed
by questions to gauge your attitude towards the vehicle based on its decision.
The questions concern the action’s moral acceptability, and not what yourself or anyone else
would actually do in the situation described.
You might feel that the situation as we describe it is not realistic. For example, it might say that
if the autonomous vehicle does X, then Y will happen, and you might think that this is not
realistic, that Y might not necessarily happen if the autonomous vehicle does X. If you find
yourself having these sorts of doubts, “suspend disbelief” just as you would at an unrealistic
movie and assume that this situation really is the way it’s described.
Likewise, you may feel that you need more information than is provided about the situation
before you can give your answer. If this happens, you should make your best guess about what
you think the situation is like without making any unnecessary assumptions.
Do you have any questions? If so, please ask the experimenter by emailing
nhatf001@odu.edu. Otherwise, please proceed to the next page.
Thank you in advance for your time, interest, and support.
Nathan Hatfield
Nhatf001@odu.edu
757-812-9813
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia
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No Transparency Scenario w/ Utilitarian Outcome
You have been assigned to a random block of questions as related to autonomous vehicles.
Please read the following scenario and provide a response to the questions or items below:
On the roadway is a self-driving car. The self-driving car is capable of performing all driving
functions under all conditions. The self-driving car can change lanes, turn, use signals, break,
accelerate, and monitor the roadway without the need for human intervention, which means that
the occupant does not have any control of the vehicle.

A passenger is riding in a self-driving car that is quickly approaching an intersection. In the
middle of the intersection is a group of five pedestrians legally crossing the road. On the
sidewalk, however, is a single pedestrian.
The self-driving car is faced with two options: continue straight through the intersection where it
will kill 5 pedestrians, or swerve to the right where it will kill one pedestrian.
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Is it morally acceptable for the self-driving car to direct itself toward the single pedestrian?
•
•

Please circle one answer: YES / NO
To what extent is this action morally acceptable?
o (Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)
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The self-driving car directed itself toward the single pedestrian.

•

Blame scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)
o Example question: “How much is the self-driving car itself at fault?”

Now imagine that this accident had occurred in the real world:
• Second part of blame scale
Based on what you know about the self-driving car’s capabilities and performance, please
answer the following questions:
• Trust scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)
o Example question: “The autonomous vehicle is deceptive.”
o Manipulation check: did the self-driving car provide you with an explanation for
why it made the decision it did? Y/N
Now imagine that a human driver is in control of the vehicle, recognizes the same facts, and
faces the same decision.
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“Is it morally acceptable for the driver to direct the car toward the single pedestrian?”
• Please circle one answer: YES / NO
(Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)
No Transparency Scenario w/ Non Utilitarian Outcome
You have been assigned to a random block of questions as related to autonomous vehicles.
Please read the following scenario and provide a response to the questions or items below:
On the roadway is a self-driving car. The self-driving car is capable of performing all driving
functions under all conditions. The self-driving car can change lanes, turn, use signals, break,
accelerate, and monitor the roadway without the need for human intervention, which means that
the occupant does not have any control of the vehicle.

A passenger is riding in self-driving car that is quickly approaching an intersection. In the middle
of the intersection is a group of five pedestrians legally crossing the road. On the sidewalk,
however, is a single pedestrian.
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The self-driving car is faced with two options: continue straight through the intersection where it
will kill 5 pedestrians, or swerve to the right where it will kill one pedestrian.

Is it morally acceptable for the self-driving car to direct itself toward the single pedestrian?
• Please circle one answer: YES / NO
• To what extent is this action morally acceptable?
o (Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)
The self-driving car directed itself towards the five pedestrians.
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•

Blame scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)

Now imagine that this accident had occurred in the real world:
• Second part of blame scale
Based on what you know about the self-driving car’s capabilities and performance, please
answer the following questions:
•

Trust scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)

•

Manipulation check: did the self-driving car provide you with an explanation for why it
made the decision it did? Y/N

Now imagine that a human driver is in control of the vehicle, recognizes the same facts, and
faces the same decision.
“Is it morally acceptable for the driver to not direct the car toward the single pedestrian?”
• Please circle one answer: YES / NO
(Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)
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High Transparency Scenario w/ Utilitarian Outcome
You have been assigned to a random block of questions as related to autonomous vehicles.
Please read the following scenario and provide a response to the questions or items below:
On the roadway is a self-driving car. The self-driving car is capable of performing all driving
functions under all conditions. The self-driving car can change lanes, turn, use signals, break,
accelerate, and monitor the roadway without the need for human intervention, which means that
the occupant does not have any control of the vehicle.

A passenger is riding in self-driving car that is quickly approaching an intersection. In the middle
of the intersection is a group of five pedestrians legally crossing the road. On the sidewalk,
however, is a single pedestrian.
The self-driving car is faced with two options: continue straight through the intersection where it
will kill 5 pedestrians, or swerve to the right where it will kill one pedestrian.

57

Is it morally acceptable for the self-driving car toward the single pedestrian?
•
•

Please circle one answer: YES / NO
To what extent is this action morally acceptable?
o (Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)

Before the self-driving car acted, it informed the occupant that an ensuing crash was getting
ready to occur. This information was provided to the occupant via an icon warning on the selfdriving car’s dashboard. In addition to the icon warning, the self-driving car further notified the
passenger that it would direct itself toward the single pedestrian to ensure the least amount of
damage occurred.
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•

Blame scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)

Now imagine that this accident had occurred in the real world:
• Second part of blame scale
Based on what you know about the self-driving car’s capabilities and performance, please
answer the following questions:
•

Trust scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)

•

Manipulation check: did the self-driving car provide you with an explanation for why it
made the decision it did? Y/N

Now imagine that a human driver is in control of the vehicle, recognizes the same facts, and
faces the same decision.
“Is it morally acceptable for the driver to direct the car toward the single pedestrian?”
• Please circle one answer: YES / NO
(Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)
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High Transparency Scenario w/ Non-Utilitarian Outcome
You have been assigned to a random block of questions as related to autonomous vehicles.
Please read the following scenario and provide a response to the questions or items below:
On the roadway is a self-driving car. The self-driving car is capable of performing all driving
functions under all conditions. The self-driving car can change lanes, turn, use signals, break,
accelerate, and monitor the roadway without the need for human intervention, which means that
the occupant does not have any control of the vehicle.

The self-driving car is quickly approaching an intersection. In the middle of the intersection is a
group of five pedestrians legally crossing the road. On the sidewalk, however, is a single
pedestrian.
The self-driving car is faced with two options: continue straight through the intersection where it
will kill 5 pedestrians, or swerve to the right where it will kill one pedestrian.
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Is it morally acceptable for the self-driving car to direct itself toward the single pedestrian?
•
•

Please circle one answer: YES / NO
To what extent is this action morally acceptable?
o (Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)

Before the self-driving car acted, it informed the occupant that an ensuing crash was getting
ready to occur. This information was provided to the occupant via an icon warning on the selfdriving car’s dashboard. In addition to the icon warning, the self-driving car notified the
passenger that it would direct itself toward the five pedestrians to ensure the least amount of
damage occurred.
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•

Blame scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)

Now imagine that this accident had occurred in the real world:
• Second part of blame scale
Based on what you know about the self-driving car’s capabilities and performance, please
answer the following questions:
•

Trust scale (Scale titles will not be placed in document that participants see)

•

Manipulation check: did the self-driving car provide you with an explanation for why it
made the decision it did? Y/N

Now imagine that a human driver is in control of the vehicle, recognizes the same facts, and
faces the same decision.
“Is it morally acceptable for the driver to not direct the car toward the single pedestrian?”
• Please circle one answer: YES / NO
o (Completely unacceptable) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (Completely acceptable)

62

APPENDIX B
TRUST IN AUTOMATION SCALE
1. The autonomous vehicle is deceptive
2. The autonomous vehicle behaves in an underhanded manner
3. I am suspicious of the autonomous vehicle's intent, action or outputs.
4. I am wary of the autonomous vehicle.
5. The autonomous vehicle will have a harmful or injurious outcome.
6. I would be confident in the autonomous vehicle if it were my own.
7. The autonomous vehicle provides security.
8. The autonomous vehicle has integrity
9. The autonomous vehicle is dependable.
10. The autonomous vehicle is reliable.
11. I would trust the autonomous vehicle if it were my own.
12. I am familiar with the autonomous vehicle's system

63
APPENDIX C
VEHICLE BLAME SCALE
Please consider the accident that just occurred and answer these questions about responsibility.
Not at All-----------------------------Very Much

1
2

How much is the passenger at fault?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

How much is the self-driving car itself at fault?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

3

How much are the people who designed the self-driving
car at fault?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

4

How much is the company that developed the self-driving
car at fault?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

Now imagine that this accident had occurred in the real world, with another driver driving the
car.
Not at All-----------------------------Very Much

1

How strongly do you feel that the passenger of the car
should be sent to jail?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

2

How strongly do you feel that the self-driving car should
be destroyed?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

3

How strongly do you feel that the engineer who designed
the self-driving car should be punished?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

4

How strongly do you feel that the company who designed
the self-driving car should be punished financially?

0----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----10

Note: Items 2-4 in first and second section constitute the composite for blame toward the car for
the accident.
Waytz, A., Heafner, J., & Epley, N. (2014). The mind in the machine: Anthropomorphism increases trust in an
autonomous vehicle. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 52, 113-117.
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APPENDIX D
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS
Please indicate you gender:
o Female
o Genderqueer/Gender Non-conforming
o Male
o Transgender Male
o Transgender Female
o Preferred identity (in addition to or not listed above):
o Prefer not to state
Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?
o Yes
o No
o Prefer not to state
Please indicate your race/ ethnicity:
o White
o Black or African American
o American Indian or Alaska Native
o Asian Indian
o Chinese
o Filipino
o Japanese
o Korean
o Vietnamese
o Native Hawaiian
o Guamanian or Chamorro
o Samoan
o Other Pacific Islander
o Other Asian
o Other:
o Prefer not to state
Citizenship:
o US
o Non-US(please specify home country):_____________
Do you commute to ODU? (Choices) Yes, No
(Follow up) If so, how long is your average commute in minutes? (Fill in) ___
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How many years have you had your driver’s license? Please put 0 for less than a year, and
N/A if you do not have a driver’s license. (Fill in)____
How often do you drive your motor vehicle in a week? (Choices) Everyday, 3-5 times a week,
Once or twice a week, I rarely drive, I do not drive/I do not have a car
(Follow up) Estimate miles driven per week. (Fill in) ___
Have you ever received a ticket for a driving violation? (Choices) Yes, No
Have you ever been involved in a traffic accident? (Choices) Yes, No
Have you ever had an accident or near-accident due to sleepiness? (Choices) Never, within
the last 6 months, within the last year, within the last 5 years
Thank you for completing this survey!
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